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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

IC-72-0216

20 March 1972 (Monday pm)

Notes on Meeting in DASD(I) Office on CIRIS-72 Data Call

Present: Showers [redacted]
Bowen-Vance-Morrison-Lindenauer

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1. Vance opened the discussion by saying that we were present to talk about (1) relation of CIRIS to this proposed data call; and (2) how IC and ASD(I) could work together on improving data system. Vance said the Showers [redacted] briefing was liked by Hall, who directed his people to "work informally". Vance reminded Hall that there was an immediate problem of the 72 data call; latter responded saying to work informally and ascertain how CIRIS relates to the proposed study group and what ground rules would be for that group.

2. Showers said we'd like to talk about data call separately due to the time frame. Vance said: "you mean something is better than nothing and thus the proposed call should go out now." (agreed)

3. Showers said he was ready to meet with the IC group several times weekly from now on; he said the group was looking at calendar year 73, because it was too late to impact on 72. Thus, he proposed now discussing getting the 72 call moving.

4. Bowen said that his concern for the 72 call was due to need for DoD to tighten up on data calls per ASD(C) responsibilities and March 72 Laird instruction to all hands. (We came back with copies of these two documents.) Therefore, Dr. Hall would have to believe that a proposed CIRIS 72 call was desirable on balance; this had to be demonstrated.

5. Showers said the GDIP people had not gone out with a separate call, relying on CIRIS to do this for them. Bowen commented that in this case it would be helpful to have a statement from Bennett on his reliance on CIRIS. Showers said that NSA was no problem since it only required a tape to be run off for DCI of info NSA had for their internal purposes. On balance, Showers said that the GDIP was about 90% of the total problem, and explained this was largely due to the number of program elements, the necessity to go to the field to obtain data, etc.

6. [redacted] reviewed the specifics of the proposed data call for Bowen, and explained how we hoped to make progress in system development by exploring ways to target orient FY-74 without going to the field for the detail.

7. Showers said that (1) GDIP depended on CIRIS mechanism to get data it needs in any event; (2) CIRIS is the only mechanism available for getting targeted information; (3) SecDef had originally agreed to participate. (We suggested that DoD was really committed from the initial TOD exercise to work along with DCI to develop this community mechanism.)

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8. [] noted that some studies depended on CIRIS type data.

9. Bowen said that the discussion was developing well but he would need to provide Dr. Hall with information on what penalties we would incur if there were no data call. He left the meeting at this point, requesting the group to continue the discussion and reach conclusions that he could use to convince Dr. Hall.

10. Showers tactfully led the conversation to elicit a DASD(I) response to the point that we had understood that Dr. Hall had heretofore agreed that the CIRIS-72 data call should go ahead, and that the CIRIS briefing he had received was not connected with that decision. Bowen replied that this was not the case, that the briefing to Hall was viewed by the DoD people as being a means whereby they could decide whether Hall would or would not support CIRIS.

11. Vance noted that if we can sell Hall we still had to work this out with ASD(C) and his data call injunction. Vance noted that the trade off analyses called for in the latter's instructions had not been done. Bowen noted that that instruction came along late as an added factor.

12. Bowen left. Vance said that no doubt we need a mgmt information system and probably some 90% of it is in the CIRIS green book. One selling point, he said, was that we as a community want to cure a community problem and thus we must have a data call now. Vance continued that Hall must understand the full depth of the DCI long term need for data.

13. Showers replied saying that such a larger question could not be answered immediately. Vance responded that like it or not, the immediate CIRIS issue was tied to the much larger issues: such as fiscal cycle levels of information; must data be made available in another format later; must we update PBDs and POMs; etc. Vance said that there is no way to answer those questions in detail; they can be answered intellectually and conceptually. Vance said Hall was concerned that he might find himself signing off on a precedent as to data the DCI might want. Therefore, Vance said, information had to be provided about the penalties on DCI and on DoD if no CIRIS inputs, showing the kinds of analyses that could not be made. He commented that Bowen understood that CIRIS was the only mechanism available to target orient resources. Also, a trade off analysis of the cost of getting vs. the risk of not having.

14. With this sort of evidence developed, next we should turn to the ground rules for the proposed working group. What basic documents could be expected to be called for in addition to CIRIS; when in the cycle?

15. Vance said that putting this proposed data call in the context of overall DCI requirements and scope of total DCI needs is the big policy issue.

16. Therefore, Vance said in summary, as quickly as possible (in a couple of days) we should jointly develop the materials on the following points:

- (a) Identify penalties to DCI if no CIRIS data call [redacted] 25X1
- (b) Identify penalties to DoD if no CIRIS data call (Vance)
- (c) Analyze DoD regulation (Vance/Fitts)
- (d) Present overview: i.e., terms of reference for study group; CIRIS data call placed in context of DCI's total level of needs; tell how ASD(I) would participate in proposed study group.

Vance proposed that the group reconvene later in the week to assemble the results of their research. Then Vance and Bowen could go to Hall with the resulting proposal and conclusions. 25X1

cc: Showers

[redacted]
DCI/IC/DSG

[redacted] (subject copy: CIRIS-72, Vol. II file)

(Note to IC recipients: I am preparing an analysis of the DOD Instruction on controlling information requests, both within DOD and from external agencies. Overall, my judgment is that this can be a very messy situation if ASD(I) or ASD(Comptroller) want to be bureaucratic. It has a much wider potential application than CIRIS, because while "substantive intelligence reporting is excluded, all aspects of data gathering for program review, resource allocation, review of performance, conduct of special studies," etc. are included. Likewise, SecDef Laird's follow-up memo of 6 March 72 to the DOD Departments and Agencies mentions (as an illustration) that Defense participation in USIB, when it comes to controlling interagency information requirements, should be such as to "avoid conflict with the overall DOD position." This appears to be the reason why Admiral Showers was asked to prepare a working paper summary that would include discussion of the total DCI/IC data need in addition to CIRIS.)

NCF